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Whatmakes possible the co-creation ofmeaningful action? In this paper, we go
in search of an answer to this question by combining insights from interactional
sociology and enaction. Both research schools investigate social interactions as
such, and conceptualize their organization in terms of autonomy. We ask what
it could mean for an interaction to be autonomous, and discuss the structures
and processes that contribute to and are maintained in the so-called interaction
order. We also discuss the role played by individual vulnerability as well as the
vulnerability of social interaction processes in the co-creation of meaningful
action. Finally, we outline some implications of this interdisciplinary fraterniza-
tion for the empirical study of social understanding, in particular in social
neuroscience and psychology, pointing out the need for studies based on
dynamic systems approaches on origins and references of coordination, and
experimental designs to help understand human co-presence.1. Introduction
Imagine meeting someone you know has the same cultural background as you
do, somewhere abroad, where the convention of greeting is different from what
you share with this person. How will you greet each other? Will you offer your
cheek? Or move in for a hug? How will you make sure you do not end up kis-
sing on the lips? It may be a little awkward, but you will eventually end up
greeting each other. You will coordinate and negotiate a social event. In so
doing, you will co-create a meaningful action, which neither of you could
have done alone, or outside of its particular context.1
Three mutually influencing systemic levels are at stake here: (i) single indi-
viduals who, (ii) in a particular societal and cultural context, come together in
(iii) a face-to-face interaction.2 Here, we focus on what happens at the intersec-
tion of these three levels in order to better understand the co-creation of
meaningful action.
The co-creation of action ormeaning—part of intersubjectivity described in its
broadest sense as social understanding—has fallen somewhat into the cracks
between mainstream sociology and cognitive science because, traditionally
(and putting it bluntly), the one has mainly been interested in socio-cultural
norms and organization, and the other mainly in individual cognition. Two
elements have largely been missing from both fields. Firstly, face-to-face inter-
actions—the central and primary locus of the co-creation of meaningful action.
And secondly, action and meaning, in both fields, have been taken for granted,
either as culturally given (e.g. shared norms), or determined by individual predis-
positions (e.g. in terms of internal representations). Therefore, the generation of
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to the questions: What makes possible the co-creation
of action and meaning? In which ways do the interplays
(including tensions) between face-to-face interactions and the
individual, and between face-to-face interactions and the
historico-socio-cultural context contribute to that process?
Two approaches, one within sociology and one within cog-
nitive science, seem well poised to address these questions:
interactional sociology, and the enactive approach to intersub-
jectivity. The first approach was started by Erving Goffman
(e.g. [1,2]) whose ethnographic studies described the organiz-
ation of face-to-face interaction. Goffman’s research questions
were taken up by conversation analysts (e.g. [3,4]) who devel-
oped a method to investigate audio- and video-recordings of
naturally occurring interactions, to reveal the basic structural
organizations that make ordered interaction possible. The
second approach, enaction, is a naturalistic, non-reductionist
approach to cognition defined as sense-making, which is the
relational process of signification between an autonomous,
self-organizing, embodied, animate agent and the world. The
agent’s perspective on and understanding of their world is
based in their self-organization, because it entails certain
needs and constraints [5,6]. Intersubjectivity, then, is the way
in which lived, situated, bodily coordinations between such
cognizers form and transform the ways in which they make
sense of each other and the world together [7].
Both approaches seek to overcome blindnesses to the inter-
actional generation of meaningful action of their respective
mother disciplines (sociologyand cognitive science).We believe
both can contribute to answering the question—interactional
sociology for its careful scrutiny of organizational properties
of interactions; and enaction for its definition of both social
interaction processes and of individuals in terms of autonomy,
and for its study of their interplay in terms of participatory
sense-making [7].
In this paper, we bring these fields into a dialogue.
Together they can elucidate the question of what enables
the co-creation of meaning. We first investigate, in §2, face-to-
face interactions and analyse their organization in terms
of the autonomy of interaction processes and the elements
that sustain their organization. In §3, we delve deeper into
the interplay between this interactional self-organization and
individual self-organization, since it is in this interplay that
actions and meanings are collaboratively created. Throughout
the paper, we explicate and interweave terms, conceptual-
izations and examples from interactional sociology and
enaction. This braiding of the approaches allows us, in §4,
to propose ways in which social interaction’s role in the co-
creation ofmeaning can be empirically researched, particularly
in social neuroscience and in psychology.2. The organization of interaction
To understand the co-creation of action or meaning, we need
to get a firm grip on the organization of social interaction.
Possibly one of themost fruitful ways to approach interactional
organization—one that is unique to both fields, and sets them
apart from other disciplines—is to view the interaction process
as an autonomous system.
When looking for an account of interaction as an auton-
omous system, we are taking up a perspective that in recent
decades has been conceptualized as relational sociology: aperspective on social life that foregrounds unfolding relations
rather than individual or collective substances [8]. At the level
of macro-sociology, in considering ‘how resources, goods,
and even positions flow through particular figurations of
social ties’ ([8], p. 298), this perspective has yielded the
social-network analysis of White (e.g. [9]) and many others.
In this paper, however, we focus on the micro-sociology of
such relations as they appear in face-to-face social inter-
actions. Here, Erving Goffman can be considered as the
most influential figure. He has most convincingly formulated
the idea of autonomy of social interaction. For him, the auton-
omous realm of the ‘interaction order’ should be treated ‘as a
substantive domain in its own right’, in which ‘the contained
elements fit together more closely than with elements beyond
the order’ ([2], p. 2).
But what does it mean for the elements to ‘fit together
more closely’? Goffman never defined it, but enaction does.
For enaction, a system—be it a social interaction or a living
system—is autonomous when it is composed of processes
that actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious
conditions [10,11]. An autonomous system self-organizes, and
hence forms an identity and differentiates itself from the
environment. To generate an identity means to possess the
property of operational closure. This means that for any con-
stituent process of the system, there are always one or more
other processes in the system that enable it or are a condition
for it (i.e. there are no processes that are not conditioned by
other processes in the network, though conditions external
to the system may also be necessary for any of the system’s
processes). The conditions under which the system self-
organizes are precarious, which means that if the system was
not organized like a network of processes, under otherwise
equal physical conditions, isolated component processes of
the system would tend to run down or extinguish. In other
words, an autonomous system depends for its organization
and self-maintenance on its component processes and their
relations, and they in turn depend on the network. Autonomy
defined in this way has been proposed to emerge and to gener-
ate identities at different levels, ranging from metabolic, over
sensorimotor, neuro-dynamical, immune and social systems
[6,10–14]. The fact that such a system is precarious, moreover,
means that it may not be able to deal with all the perturba-
tions that can happen to it. We will pick up the theme of
precariousness again in §3.
What can this enactive definition of autonomous systems
mean for exploring the Goffmanian interaction order? First,
enaction proposes that an autonomous system differentiates
itself from the environment, forming an operational closure.
In interactional sociology, the environment from which the
interaction order differentiates itself has been understood as
consisting of two other organizations: (i) large-scale social
institutions, and (ii) individual actors. This means that the
‘contained elements’ of the interaction order (i.e. structures
and practices that organize situated social interactions; see
below) are to be distinguished from these two organizations.
The large-scale social institutions fromwhich the interaction
order differentiates itself include durable social structures such
as legal or economic orders, family relations or, more generally,
cultural orientations and expectations. The face-to-face social
interaction order, albeit linked to these socio-cultural structures,
has its own properties that are not defined by them. This shows
in the fact that the key rules and practices of social interaction
remain there, regardless of the socio-cultural environment of
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the socio-cultural contexts [15], but recognizably same practices
can be found across those contexts: as Goffman puts it, ‘ped-
estrian traffic rules can be studied in crowded kitchens as well
as crowded streets, interruption rights at breakfast as well as
in courtrooms, endearment vocatives in supermarkets as well
as in the bedroom’ ([2], p. 2).
The other organization fromwhich the interaction order dis-
tinguishes itself consists of the individuals participating in
interaction. The operational closure of the interaction shows
up in the way in which the rules and practices of social inter-
action are ‘social facts’: highly conventionalized and rooted in
strong social norms. While all their realizations take place
through individuals’ actions that require cognitive, emotional,
perceptual and attentional competences, the rules and practices
themselves have persistence over any single acting individual
and individual differences (e.g. [4,16]). In social encounters,
they both enable and constrain the participating individuals’
actions, thereby generating the identity of the interaction as a
self-organized system, which cannot be reduced to things like
individual actors’ communicative intentions.
While interaction as an autonomous system differentiates
itself from the environment, it does not isolate itself. In the en-
activist view, processes within the operational closure of an
autonomous system can be linked to processes external to the
system, and conditions external to the system may well also
be necessary for any ‘within-system’ processes. This resonates
with Goffman [2], who, in discussing the relationship between
the interaction order and the other social orders, suggested
that ‘[e]xploring relations between orders is critical, a subject
matter in its own right’ ([2], p. 2). As for the linkages between
interaction as an autonomous system, and the acting individ-
uals, studies on how conversations reshape participants’
memories [17] are a case in point, showing that the organiz-
ation of conversation, in terms of its constellation of social
roles, is consequential upon theways inwhich the participants’
memories are reformed. In §3, we will specifically go into
the question of how the individual as a system relates to the
systemic properties of social interaction.
Let us now turn to the very organization of interaction as
an autonomous system. What are the key features of this
organization, and how do they relate? Both interactional soci-
ology and enaction view the autonomy of social interaction
as arising from the coordination of behaviours. A basic differ-
ence between the two fields is that interactional sociology
approaches the coordination of behaviours in a more structural
way—speaking of structures and practices as normative prin-
ciples that are there, as social facts, prior to any situated
social interaction, while enaction views coordination more in
terms of emergent processes. This different orientation stems
from differences in background and methodology. It is not a
very strict division, and each field also has affinities with the
other’s perspective. Initially, however, interactional sociology
and enactivismdiffer in terms of their perspectives, prioritizing
either structure or process. Taking this as a basis for discussion
is handy for illuminating how both fields can mutually inform
and enhance each other.
We discuss coordination of behaviour in interaction first
from a more structural perspective, and then from a more
processual perspective, in each case also already indicating
and searching overlaps and connections between the two
starting points, as well as drawing attention to aspects of
the autonomy of interaction.(a) Structural perspective on coordination
In this section, we extract from contributions by Goffman and
conversation analysts four interlocking domains of coordina-
tion: co-presence, engagement, turn-taking and sequentiality. Each
of these has identifiable structures that organize interaction.(i) Co-presence
Goffman defined social interaction as what happens in
co-presence: as ‘that which uniquely transpires in (. . .)
environments in which one or more individuals are phys-
ically in one another’s response presence’ ([2], p. 3). The
co-presence involves ‘mutual monitoring possibilities’
where the participants are accessible to each other’s senses
[18,19]; it is the most primordial domain of coordination
with identifiable structural features.
Co-presence brings along both strong normative orien-
tations, i.e. what ought and ought not to be done in the
others’ presence, and a special experiential state, i.e. awareness
of the others’ presence. Even when the co-present participants
are ‘just’ in the same place at the same time, without being
directly involved in joint actions such as conversation, they
will still strongly orient themselves to the others’ presence,
by attending to cultural rules that ‘establish how individuals
are to conduct themselves by virtue of being in a gathering’
([18], p. 135). Such rules define, for example, the main
involvement in each type of gathering (e.g. exercising in
a gym, reading and writing in a library), how additional
involvements are to be organized vis-a`-vis the main one,
as well as the expected physical appearance and patterns
of movement.
Individuals are virtually unable to ignore co-presence and
the rules arising from it, at least not without a considerable
moral cost. Co-presence stands out as something that the
individuals have to take into account in all their actions.
Being in an elevator with another person, while acknowled-
ging their presence without initiating a closer encounter, is
a situation where the structural features of co-presence mani-
fest themselves in a condensed form: in all our doings, we are
directed to the others’ body postures, gaze directions, move-
ments, them perceiving us and being perceived by us. In all
forms of co-presence, we exercise similar, albeit less con-
scious attention to the others’ presence. What emerges out
of such situations is never under the control of any single
individual. Even trying not to have an encounter is a coord-
inated achievement of several participants producing a
behavioural pattern with certain self-organizing properties.(ii) Engagement
The other key domain of coordination has to do with people’s
management of the cognitive, affective and behavioural
involvement in the interaction. There are two basic forms
of co-presence that Goffman distinguished throughout his
career: gathering and encounter (e.g. [18,19]). A gathering
involves ‘mere’ co-presence, attendance to the cultural rules
briefly discussed above. An encounter, then again, involves a
new layer of engagement: Goffman characterized the encoun-
ter by saying that its participants ‘jointly ratify one another as
authorized co-sustainers of a single, albeit moving, focus of
visual and cognitive attention’ ([19], p. 134). The participants
attend to each other, what they refer to, or observe together
in the environment.
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participants is manifested in the engagement of the partici-
pants in their shared focus of attention. The participants’
behaviours become coordinated through this mutual immer-
sion in the interaction. In spite of its apparent spontaneity,
such engagement has strong socio-normative backing: it is
expected from the participants of an encounter ([19], p. 134)
and, accordingly, the initiations and terminations of encoun-
ters are surrounded by rituals that facilitate coordination at
the critical junctures between encounters, where such an expec-
tation holds, and gatherings, where such an expectation does
not hold.
(iii) Turn-taking
The third domain of coordination in social interaction has to do
with distribution of opportunities for talk. The distribution of
turns at talk is based on rules that have durability over time
and across individuals. These rules constrain the actions of
the individual participants. Sacks et al. [3] outlined their key
features. Here, the coordination of behaviour is based on the
participants’ incessant orientation to norms and conventions
providing that: (i) Verbal communication in social encounters
is organized in turns at talk that alternate between the partici-
pants. (ii) Current speaker is initially entitled to one turn
constructional unit (smallest amount of talk that in its sequen-
tial context counts as a turn). (iii) The completion of such a unit
is a transition relevance place where the speaker change may
occur. (iv) A current speaker may select the next; if (s)he does
not do that, any participant can self-select at the transition rel-
evance place; and if even that does not happen, the current
speaker may (but need not) continue.
Virtually all spoken utterances are produced and received
in the structural matrix provided by turn-taking rules
(cf. [20])—and this seems to hold for signed utterances as
well [21]. Many institutional settings involve specific appli-
cations of these rules [15], but also in these settings, the
coordination of behaviour is a result of all the participants
abiding by the specific turn-taking rules characteristic of that
particular institution.
(iv) Sequentiality
The fourth domain of coordination in social interaction
involves the relationship between utterances, including non-
verbal communicative actions, as they occur one after the
other. Social norms and expectations tie consequent communi-
cative actions together in specific, partially predictable ways.
These conversational structures also establish interaction as
autonomous vis-a`-vis the individual actors: they enable and
constrain all communicative action.
Single acts are parts of larger entities [4]. Themost basic and
themost important among such entities iswhat in conversation
analysis is called adjacency pair [22]: a unit consisting of
two actions in which the first action performed by one partici-
pant invites a particular type of second action to be performed
by their co-participant. Typical examples of adjacency pairs
include question–answer, greeting–greeting and request–
grant/refusal. The first action generates a pressure towards
the projective second speaker to produce a relevant response.
Thereby, the adjacency pair structure enables the possible
first speakers to elicit specific responses from others (by for
example asking a question). At the same time, it is in and
through their response, that also the second speaker has apossibility to define the status of the first speaker’s behaviour
as action (a question ‘is’ a question inasmuch as it is responded
to with an answer). Hence, the autonomy of the interaction is
revealed by the adjacency pairs beingmore than their constitu-
ent parts. Neither a first pair part nor a second pair part can be
defined without the other, but they are part of one and the
same process ([23], p. 286).
By now,we have discussed four domains of coordination of
behaviour in interaction—co-presence, engagement, turn-
taking and sequentiality—where normatively based structures
exceeding time and space facilitate coordination, and thereby
contribute to the autonomy of social interaction. These
domains also hang together, conditioning each other. In
social interaction, co-presence is the primary domain of coord-
ination. When there is co-presence, engagement becomes
possible (but engagement is not necessary for there to be co-
presence). Engagement, then, is necessary for the remaining
two domains of coordination, turn-taking and sequentiality—
shared attention and involvement are needed for taking turns
and for producing sequentially organized actions. Overall,
these four domains of coordination are constituent parts of
the kind of ‘participation structure’ ([24], p. 52) that character-
izes all human social interaction (see also the first model
in [25]).(b) Emergent processual perspective on coordination
Now, let us take a look at how enaction views the organization
of interaction. Unlike interactional sociology, which highlights
the structures that facilitate coordination, enaction describes
interactional organization in terms of dynamic, emergent proces-
ses of coordination. Coordination is a ubiquitous phenomenon
in and between biological systems [26,27], and much of the
coordination that happens in social interactions does not require
high-level cognitive skills [7]. Enaction analyses the complex
temporality of coordination, different kinds and references of
coordination and its relationship with social agency.(i) The temporality of coordination
Coordination happens at multiple timescales [27], ranging from
fast neural and physiological coordination, over mid-range be-
havioural and gestural coordination within single encounters,
to the longer term continuity of interactional patterns and
topics of talk over consequent encounters or, more broadly,
interaction histories and inter-personal relationships.3 Enaction
deals with this temporal complexity and multilayeredness by
using the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory
(e.g. [28,29]).
Further aspects of interactional coordination’s complex
temporality are, for instance, degrees of coordination. Kelso
describes how a child and an adult walking together (and
having to adjust their strides to each other) do not mostly
move in perfect synchrony (‘absolute’ coordination), but
rather relatively coordinate, meaning that they move into and
out of zones of high synchrony [26]. The coordination associ-
ated with interactional organizations such as turn-taking are
also usually relative in this sense. The turn-taking system
allows for different sizes of turn [3], and turns at talk are
designed so that a transition space becomes recognizable for
the participants. The next speaker typically starts their utter-
ance at some point during this transition space but not
exactly at a given point in time [20]. Coordination occurs in
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Coordination can also be ofmany kinds in terms of its origins or
reference points [30,31]. We can conceptually distinguish
between at least external coordination, pre-coordination, functional
coordination, coordination-with and coordination-to. External
coordination happens when several people are each coordi-
nated to a third event or process, e.g. their aerobics teacher, or
a film, and therefore seem to be coordinated with each other
in moving in the same way, making similar expressions, or
showing similar neural activations at the same time. People
are pre-coordinated when they act together according to a
shared history, cultural patterns, societal norms, roles or insti-
tutions, or even their personal shared interactional history
(e.g. a national or a familial greeting custom). Functional
coordination is coordination that serves (has a function for)
the interaction, e.g. arranging to meet, i.e. to interact later.
Finally, coordination-with and coordination-to mark the differ-
ence between a mutual or co-regulated coordination and an
individual, singular attunement to a patterned event or process.
For instance, I coordinate with you over a smoothly running
video-connection, but if I were later to view a recording of
what I saw you doing before, I can only coordinate to that. It
is, in fact, hardly possible for humans (and animals) to purely
‘coordinate-to’ (and it has repeatedly been shown that attempts
to coordinate-with when it is only possible to coordinate-to can
be upsetting and disruptive of social understanding, see
[32–34]). Coordination is also highly dependent on embodied
and situated constraints that affect it, and which can and
should be taken into account when investigating it.
To illustrate the robustness of coordination and the inter-
play of its structural and dynamical elements, we may think
about telephone closings, where the turn-taking apparatus
has to be stopped. For this purpose, people resort to specific
closing rituals—i.e. social practices by which the pressure to
keep coordinating can be relaxed. As shown by Schegloff &
Sacks [22], the move to closing is often instigated through
the exchange of ‘okays’, which is then followed by reciprocal
salutations, well-wishes, saying each other’s name, endear-
ment terms and the like. Furthermore, such closings are
usually rhythmically well integrated—i.e. there is an isochron-
ous structure of prosodically prominent syllables, whose
tempo normally accelerates so that the final salutations are
either latched to each other or produced on the same rhythmic
beat [35]. Telephone closings thus provide a clear example of
how collaborative systemic dynamics and structural patterns
may be intertwined in the unfolding of social interaction: the
closing ritual has a wide normative backing but, each time,
its realization is an emergent product of two participants’ inter-
actional contributions. Besides, the example is indicative
of the autonomy of interaction: to break the expectations of
continuity requires special effort and ritual care.
Let us come back to the example of greeting. The acquain-
tances meeting each other abroad orient themselves to
conflicting sets of norms and conventions pre-coordinating the
greeting ritual. There are their shared native cultural norms,
but also those of the country they now are in. Furthermore, the
participants have their relational history, involving prior greet-
ings and shared memories of encounters with particular
degrees of intimacy and deference. The greeting is thereforeheavily pre-coordinated, but this alone does not suffice to
organize it. Necessarily, the greeting participants will have to
coordinate-with: one will notice the other first and will attract
their attention; situational constraints permitting, they will
approach each other; one will indicate first, with body move-
ments, willingness to engage in a particular type of salutation
(be it kiss, embrace, handshake or mere verbal salutation), and
the other will either align with this, or engage in another type
of salutation. This coordination-with may be mingled with
elements of coordination-to; as Kendon [36] shows, initiating a
greeting ritual involves one participant attracting the attention
of the other: at the moment when I have noticed you but you
have not yet noticedme, I am arguably coordinating my actions
to you. We also find functional coordination: the greeting opens
up a state of heightenedmutual access between the participants
([37], p. 76–80), and thereby, it is highly functional for the
encounter that will follow.
Together, these different elements of coordination show
the influence of the three levels we introduced in §1: the indi-
viduals, the socio-cultural context and the social interaction.
The interaction process, as we postulated at the beginning
of this section, is to an extent autonomous in the unfolding
of the greeting: no matter what kinds of coordinations are
at play, none of them alone or their sum, or the individual
mechanisms that aid in sustaining the interaction, can fully
predict the actions that will occur, or the significances they
will have for the interactors.3. The interplays between interactional and
individual autonomy in the co-creation of
meaningful action
For interactional sociology, meaningful action can already be
found at the level of the organization of interaction. Meanings
of actions are conceptualized as social meanings, ordinarily as
something that the interaction participants share; in a sense,
as something that does not reside in the individual actors,
but in the actions themselves. As seen from this perspect-
ive, actions are meaningful, rather than something that is
endowed with meaning [38].
For enaction, however, a fundamental element is missing
before we can speak of meaning: the individual person. In the
enactive perspective, meaning is generated between persons
participating in interactions—where both the individuals and
the interactions are of equal importance. Persons are moving,
animate, experiencing, social subjects. Enaction understands
them too in terms of autonomy, as we will see below. It is
time to bring these individuals into the fold. In this section,
we shine a light on the interplay between subjects and the
interactions in which they participate. Interactional sociology
has interesting things to offer there too—perhaps unexpectedly,
since it does not like to thematize the individual much—as we
will see.
The interactional sociology perspective on the relation-
ship between individual and interaction was encapsulated
in Goffman’s ([39], p. 3) famous phrase: ‘Not, then, men
and their moments. Rather moments and their men’. In
exploring the relationships between the individual and the
interaction order, Goffman thus prioritized, at least methodo-
logically, the latter. While he maintained that understanding
the individual is necessary for the study of interaction, such
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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stripped and cramped to suit the sociological study of conver-
sation, track meets, banquets, jury trials, and street loitering’
([39], p. 2). Below, we will argue that Goffman’s psychology
may in fact be more sophisticated than he wanted his readers
to think. However, the position of enactivism is different.
Enactivism not only emphasizes the autonomy of interaction,
but likewise, the autonomy of the individuals participating in
the interaction.
The enactive definition of social interaction requires
that both the individuals involved and the interaction are
autonomous, before we can speak of a social interaction.
According to this definition, we can speak of a social
interaction only if both the following conditions are met:
(i) there is a co-regulation at the level of interaction dynamics
that takes on an autonomous organization; and (ii) the auton-
omy of the individuals participating in the interaction is not
destroyed in the process (though it can be de- or increased)
([7], p. 493). Enaction in this way makes explicit a necessary ten-
sion between individual participants on the one hand, and the
interaction as a process on the other. If there is only interactional
organization, we cannot yet speak of a social interaction. Simi-
larly, if one of the participants completely dominates the
interaction, we are not dealing with a social interaction (it
would be like interacting with an object, not with another sub-
ject). Imagine a couple dance: one cannot lead unless the other
assumes the role of follower, and if one participant does not con-
tribute to the moves, it would be like carrying a doll across the
dance floor. Thus, not only is the interaction process auton-
omous in terms of its internal organization, it also depends,
crucially, on the autonomy of the individuals participating in
it. In this way, for enaction, interactional organization requires
both interactional and individual autonomy.
If both interaction and individual are autonomous sys-
tems, then they are in continual tension with each other in
each ongoing interaction. These tensions get manifested in
what might be called vulnerability. What is interesting
about the confluence of enaction and interactional sociology
that we propose in this paper, is that both the individual
and the interaction can be conceptualized as vulnerable. Vul-
nerability hangs together closely with autonomy. It is at the
interplay between individual and interactional autonomy
and vulnerabilities that the co-creation of significance and
significant action happens, as we will now show.
Let us first consider individual vulnerability. Vulner-
ability is intimately related to individual autonomy.
Autonomy is at the basis of how an individual understands
their world. Individual self-organization, which is to the
deepest level embodied, naturally entails needs and con-
straints, since certain things a sense-maker encounters will
be beneficial for its self-maintenance, and others will be
pernicious. The first kind should be sought out, and the
second avoided [5,10]. This is the intrinsic teleology of living
self-organization, according to enaction.4
Living self-organizing systems are precarious, which
means that they can be threatened (and, in the reality of the
biological, physical world, are continually threatened, also
from within—see the definition of precariousness and an
explanation of its importance in the enactive framework [11]).
When a self-organizing system has some way of anticipating
or foreseeing such threats and adapting its actions and action
tendencies to this, it can be said to be a sense-maker, for
whom things have intrinsic, existential, affective, experiencedsignificance [10]. Thus, vulnerability is at the heart of the
very sense-making that characterizes living self-organizing
systems, such as human individuals.
In spite of him claiming that his psychology is ‘stripped
and cramped’, Goffman’s work shows how particular vulner-
ability is at the heart of the individual’s participation in social
interaction. This vulnerability involves the self. Goffman [1]
pointed out that an individual invests much psychic energy
in their socially recognized self-image, or face. The face con-
sists of positive social attributes. Therefore, it is essentially
derived from the supplies that society can offer. Importantly,
the individual face is also utterly dependent on interactional
recognition and confirmation: our images as competent
human actors, as men or women, or as incumbents of any
other social identity are in the hands of our interaction part-
ners [41]. Physical and spatio-temporal arrangements are also
involved: claims for personal space and temporary occu-
pation of objects such as chairs, objects attached to the
body, rights to control others’ access into conversation, as
well as ownership of personal information [37]. Through vio-
lations of all this, the individual’s self, or face, can be
questioned. Hence, as Rawls ([42], p. 140) puts it, the ‘indi-
vidual is never secure in an encounter’. In other words, the
maintenance of face is a key aspect of individual autonomy.
This aspect of individual autonomy is in constant need of
ratification that can only be received by acting within the
system of interaction.
Interactions as autonomous systems, too, are inherently
vulnerable, misunderstanding being the most obvious and
continuous threat for them. Thus, there are many different
kinds of processes and mechanisms to secure mutual under-
standing in the face of potentially difficult circumstances. For
example, to enhance language comprehension, participants
have been found to draw on their immediately preceding
experience to fine-tune their expectations about the kinds of
phonetic and syntactic features of speech signal that are likely
to occur in a given context [43,44]. The practices of conversa-
tional repair [4,45], then again, have evolved to deal with
those moments of interaction when the threat of misunder-
standing has momentarily realized; these practices have been
argued to be of vital importance in securing and restoring inter-
subjective understanding in conversational interaction [46]. The
operation of turn-taking also has its ruptures, for example, in
simultaneous onset of two turns at talk or by one participant
interrupting the other’s turn. These ruptures can be in the ser-
vice of activities at hand or can go against them, and they
have standardized locally managed solutions [3,47,48].
A more subtle and yet most intriguing vulnerability of
interaction has to do with engagement in encounters. In
§2, we referred to the duality in Goffman’s [39] account of
engagement: while spontaneous involvement in conversa-
tion—something Goffman calls unio mystico—is both a highly
valued experience and a social norm, the reality of an encoun-
ter is usually different, as the participants drift towards
disengagement. External pre-occupations, as well as the par-
ticipant’s consciousness of their own performance, or that of
the other, or concern about the unfolding of the interaction,
regularly hamper the unio mystico. The social system of encoun-
ter is thus inherently ambiguous, as ‘spontaneous “normal”
involvement seems to be the exception and alienation of
some kind the statistical rule’ ([39], p. 134). But whether inter-
actions are always vulnerable in this way, is a matter of
empirical research.
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ation is one of the places where he seems to have been
concerned with the subjective experience of individuals.
While downplaying the relevance of his own psychology,
Goffman eventually proffered most insightful observations of
the experience of interaction. But this was done, as it were,
between the lines. For enaction, on the other hand, subjectivity
and experience are from the beginning full and basic aspects of
social interaction [49,50]. The felt efforts of maintaining self-
organization are an integral part of enactive cognition. There
is no meaning-making without a subject to or for whom things
affectively and experientially make sense, even if it is not
always explicit. Many preliminaries of making sense happen
below, before, or on the cusp of awareness. In relation to
social sense-making, we may even consider that there is often
an ‘invisible excess of sense’, a presence of hidden, ineffable
or even secret meanings, which is best left to play its role as
precisely silent [51].
We can thus speak of a primordial tension between individ-
ual and interactive autonomy [25]. Individuals are almost
continually engaged in different ongoing social interactions
that influence them. Even when no other is immediately
present, we engage in relational patterns that affect our sense-
making and are affected by it, such that a social interaction is
sustained over time. This is illustrated, for instance, in research
showing how spouses’ quality of life remains interdependent,
even after one partner dies [52]. Balancing interactional and
individual autonomy and vulnerability or precariousness, is
therefore a matter of co-regulating the interaction, and of
regulating one’s participation in interaction [25,53].
One conceptualization of such co-regulation of interaction,
relevant to enactivism and interactional sociology alike, comes
from the dynamic systems theory of Beebe & Lachman [54].
Investigating mother–baby interaction and psychotherapy,
they propose that there is an ‘intimate connection between
self- and interactive regulation’ ([54], p. 22), as behaviours
employed in self-regulation have equally a role ‘in influencing,
and being influenced by, the partner’ ([54], p. 22). The linkage
between self- and interactive regulation is bidirectional—that
is, the means for regulating interaction also serve as means
for self-regulation. Pera¨kyla¨ et al. [55] recently applied this co-
regulation perspective by investigating autonomic nervous
system responses in tellers and recipients of conversational
stories. The verbal and non-verbal displays of affiliation by
the story recipient decrease the storyteller’s level of arousal
but increase that of the recipient. Affiliative behaviours
(e.g. facial expressions, affective response tokens, verbal assess-
ments) thus not only influence the course of the overt
interaction, but also influence both participants’ internal
state. In this way, managing interaction and self-regulation in
interaction is always a co-regulation.
Co-creation of meaning, then, happens when interactors
participate in each other’s sense-making [7], i.e. when interactive
acts ‘achieve more than I intend to. And conversely, I can
achieve what I individually intend to with less, through
coordinated completion of the act by the other’ ([25], p. 13).
Managing the tensions between interactional and individual
autonomy, or dealing with breakdowns and transitions in
coordination, can be done in different ways, and is at the
origin of different forms of social agency and ‘participation
genres’ (an extension of Bakhtin’s ‘speech genres’), and
ultimately of languaging behaviour. What kind of body the
participants have, plays a basic role in this interactivemanagement, and bodies have and develop particular sensi-
tivities to and abilities in participation genres, to such an
extent that we can even speak of ‘linguistic bodies’ [25].
Let us once more return to our example of greetings.
Research has shown that people have a preference for doing
together, even if there are inherent tensions to it. In collaborat-
ing smoothly in the reaffirmation of their relationship, the
participants most efficiently satisfy each other’s face needs
([56], p. 390). Vulnerabilities are present, however. Greeting
somebody who is not prepared to greet is a major threat of
face [36], as is the choice of salutation that implies more or
less relational intimacy or status difference than the other is
prepared to show. Individual vulnerabilities and sensitivities
correspond to the vulnerability of interaction: miscoordination
of body movements and gestures, as well as the participants’
behavioural trajectories momentarily depart. But eventually,
the participants will find ways to participate in and generate
the greeting. Even in the most routine situations, this involves
co-regulation, as participants attend and respond to each
other’s actions, and thereby jointly shape the trajectory of the
interaction and re-affirm or redefine their relationship.4. Some interactive guidelines for studying the
co-creation of meaning
In this paper, we have brought together enaction and
interactional sociology to gain a fuller understanding of the
co-creation of meaningful action. We would like to conclude
on two points: (i) what both approaches can learn from each
other, and (ii) implications for empirical research.
The enactive approach complements interactive sociology
in showing that the individual can have a place in the concep-
tualization of interaction, without compromising the idea of
the autonomy of social interaction. In this view, both inter-
action and individual can be conceptualized as autonomous
systems, and it is possible to investigate the linkages between
them. This reconceptualization gives a new theoretical signifi-
cance to the classical Goffmanian observations on face and
alienation from interaction. Viewing these in an enactive
light encourages interactional sociologists to explore the
subjectivity and experience involved in them. Of equal
importance for interactional sociology is enaction’s specifica-
tion of different interlocking orders of temporality that exist
in interaction. While interactional sociology (especially con-
versation analysis) has paid much attention to sequentiality,
enaction encourages interaction sociologists to attend more
to temporal complexity, offering analytical tools to also deal
with phenomena such as synchronicity.
In turn, Goffman’s work on face-work and alienation
expands enaction’s theoretical proposals about the interplay
between individual and interactional autonomy. In the light
of the so-called interactive turn in cognitive science [57] or,
perhaps better, the intersubjective turn [58], interactional
sociology may help further specify which events, structures,
processes and properties contribute to the autonomous self-
organization of the interaction process and how; and how
they are therefore possibly in tension with the socio-cultural
and individual levels. This should help generate and formu-
late hypotheses for empirical research. For instance, enaction
has treated co-presence so far as a non-socially interactive
situation (based on the enactive definition of social inter-
action). But enactive explanations of dispositions or
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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interactive sociologists, about the question of what indeed
happens when agents are co-present and aware of each
other. Finally, interactional sociology’s emphasis on struc-
tures is a demand for enaction to further clarify questions
about the stability of modes of interaction, the settling of
conventions, etc.
Our main message is that social interactions are autono-
mous, and as such can and should be studied in their own
right to help answer the question of how we co-create mean-
ingful actions. The next question is: how? What are the
implications for the empirical study of social understanding?
In its most radical form, the idea that social interactions are
fundamental for understanding the co-creation of meaning has
led to proposals such as the interactive brain hypothesis,
according to which interactive experience and skills form the
basis of social understanding and of social brain functioning
[59,60]. As we explained in this paper and elsewhere [61],
this does not mean to just turn the individualistic logic of psy-
chology and neuroscience on its head, and to focus only on
interaction. Instead, it is necessary to understand both the inter-
active and the individual contributions to the (co-)regulation
and coordination of behaviours together [62].
Coordination in social interactions is robust, and at the
same time it has both structural and emergent aspects, which
are in continual interplay and tension with each other, as
well as with the processes of individual self-maintenance.
Using the taxonomyof structures and processes that contribute
to the self-maintenance of social interactions (introduced in §2)
will allow empirical research on the different aspects of
coordination. For example, given the fundamental significance
of turn-taking and repair organization for human joint endeav-
ours, one line of current research involves searching for
variability and universality in the turn-taking structures
[17,20] (for an extension of this line of research on marmosests,
see [63]) and in practices of repair [64] across languages and
cultures. Furthermore, sequentiality, as a basic formof coordin-
ation of interaction, rests upon the participants’ ability to
recognize each other’s behaviours as specific actions that call
for specific responses. Recent studies by Gisladottir et al.
[65,66] have started to unravel the temporal organization and
the neural underpinnings of conversational action recognition
processes. In addition, given the fine nuances of coordination
associated with the ‘mere’ spatio-temporal presence of other
persons, studies on the neural and experiential responses to
such events would be motivated ([60], p. 186, [67]). Finally,
considering the rich experimental research tradition on the
ways in which individuals respond to threats to their self-
image (e.g. [68,69]), Goffmanian theory of the interactional
maintenance of face can inform experimental designs in
this field. This would enrich our understanding of the behav-
ioural, experiential and neural aspects of the basic interactive
vulnerability of self.
As pointed out above, what contributes to the self-
organization of interaction can have different origins, ranging
from the rules of turn-taking to shared interactional histories
and pre-coordinations based in socio-cultural customs and prac-
tices. For example, experimental subjects’ neural activity can
synchronize when they view the same emotional episode of a
film or hear the same story [70,71]. Based on the perspective
that we have we presented, we can understand this as external
coordination: it is a neural synchrony on the basis of coupling
to something in common. Understanding other origins orreferences of interactive coordination—particularly in terms of
coordination-with—however, calls for further research efforts.
For this kind of work, dynamical systems techniques can
be useful. In line with our general point, these techniques can
reveal aspects of the deep structure of social interactions as
organized systems. They can indicate the presence of inter-
action-dominant dynamics (i.e. situations where the system
components cannot be said to function as independent
units but show activity correlation across many timescales)
[72]. Dynamical systems can differentiate between different
references and origins of coordination. For instance, they
can distinguish leaders and followers [73,74], and other
factors affecting coordination. Dynamical systems could
also be used to study the interplay between self-regulatory
behaviour (such as breathing, heart rate, etc.) and inter-
action-regulation (e.g. [75]). Or they may be used to assess
which factors of alienation, as Goffman called them [39],
are at play. We would need to determine how to measure
the presence of individual pre-occupations, which could be
done with eye-tracking to follow participants’ attention, or
by studying body movements of the participants in relation
to each other (e.g. through proxemics research [76]). More
subtle dynamical signatures of whether participants are ‘in
the flow’ of the shared situation can be probably also be
found. Movement trajectories may be different when partici-
pants are very engaged with each other, versus when they are
more busy with self-regulation, when interaction breaks
down, when it is being repaired, and so on. The measure of
correlations between processes happening at different time-
scales can be used to distinguish the presence of skillful
flow [77]; similar techniques could be adapted to differentiate
between levels of interactive versus individual engagement.
Finally, dynamical systems tools may also be used to examine
where which kinds of perturbations have an impact, and on
what (on interaction or on participants, on which structures,
processes or behaviours, etc.) [78,79].
Clearly, the full range between laboratory-controlled and
naturally occurring situations should be studied. It will be
important to keep in mind that our own recognition of
another person’s meaningful actions depends on what we
are currently doing, on the local relationships of contingency
that emerge between our behaviours, as well as on the nor-
mative expectations governing the specific types of
sequences and activities that we are engaged in. Moreover,
all this is intertwined with our individual and joint interac-
tional histories. We would therefore like to encourage novel
approaches that address several of these aspects at once—
something that is already increasingly possible.
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